by Wayne R. Arden and Jeffrey M. Wice; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law et al. At least. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". "Being aware," in this context, is shorthand for "taking into account," and it hardly can be doubted that legislators routinely engage in the business of making electoral predictions based on group characteristics-racial, ethnic, and the like. Pp. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. Location North Carolina General Assembly. 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. 642-649. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Constitutional Principle. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . The Court applied the same reasoning to the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided" municipal boundary line at issue in Gomillion. 5 See Richmond v. J. d. Suppose that patients in a certain control group are awake from 7 A.M. to 10 P.M. What is the average body temperature of such a patient over this wakeful period? Nor was it ever in doubt that "the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner." I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. Allen v. State Bd. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[12(t16.37)]. Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. Cf. We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts. Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." 1 "Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeatedly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a fact of life. to Juris. The food stamps cannot be used to buy wine. Id., at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). . The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services. Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this conclusion as follows: "It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts. Supp., at 467. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 422 (1977); the "stacking" of "a large minority population concentration with a larger white population," Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 85, 92 (C. Davidson ed. Although the boundary lines were somewhat irregular, the majority reasoned, they were not so bizarre as to permit of no other conclusion. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. See supra, at 642-643. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. Meanwhile, in other districting cases, specific consequential harm will still need to be pleaded and proven, in the absence of which the use of race may be invalidated only if it is shown to serve no legitimate state purpose. 3. ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). The state appellees suggest that a covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. Not so, apparently, when the districting "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines.7 In that case, we are told, such proof no longer is needed. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). The central explanation has to do with the nature of the redistricting process. to Brief for Federal Appellees lOa. The Court held that members of a racial minority group claiming 2 vote dilution through the use of multimember districts must prove three threshold conditions: that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," that the minority group is "politically cohesive," and that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Research* indicates that the body temperature T(t)T(t)T(t) (in C{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{C}C ) of patients with Alzheimer's disease fluctuates periodically over a 24-hour period according to the formula, T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[(t16.37)12]T(t)=37.29+0.46 \cos \left[\frac{\pi(t-16.37)}{12}\right] Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Ibid. ); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opinion of SOUTER, J. The voting age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. Thus, if appellants' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 1. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). or What? denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83-94 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Did the North Carolina residents who objected to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment? Appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. Dissenting Opinion (Harlan):. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. "[L]ike bloc-voting by race, [the racial composition of geographic area] too is a fact of life, well known to those responsible for drawing electoral district lines. They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." In favor of Shaw. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts 2. Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. In addition, nothing in the Court's decisions compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny; in fact, this country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting and the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when they enter the next county. What is the maximum temperature? (equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). Pp. How do you think the civil rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and politics? To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. I did not join Part IV of his opinion in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), because I felt that its "additional argument," id., at 165, was not necessary to decide that case. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. (emphasis added). A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? The U.S. Supreme Court and the federal government should encourage states to find ways to comply with the act, even if compliance results in oddly shaped districts, the attorney argued. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). Its decision not to create the more compact southern majority-minority district that was suggested, on the other hand, was more likely a result of partisan considerations. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. Suppose a person who buys only wine and cheese is Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. The fact that it now chooses to apply strict scrutiny when a law is meant to benefit a race that has been the subject of historical discrimination makes no sense. Id., at 472-473. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the Texas case, said the path on which the Court had embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from which he also dissented, had proven unworkable. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group--regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which the live--think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Id., at 179 (opinion concurring in judgment) (some citations omitted). The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. Under the three-part test established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 50-51 (1986), a minority group must show that it could constitute the majority in a single-member district, "that it is politically cohesive," and "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id., at 50-51. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." See Fed. It spite of such criticisms, the redistricting accomplished its goal. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." to Juris. The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). Id., at 53-54. It also sends to elected representatives the message that their primary obligation is to represent only that group's members, rather than their constituency as a whole. Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for State Appellees 5, n. 6. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. Other decisions of this Court adhere to the same standards. The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. If not, it does not. O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. See supra, at 647-649. Such approval would be forthcoming only if the plan did not jeopardize minority representation. Ante, at 652. districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. Statement 89a-90a; see also Brief for Appellants 31-32. Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. Before us, the state appellees contend that the General Assembly's revised plan was necessary not to prevent retrogression, but to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2, as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). See App. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. of Ed., supra, at 282-283 (plurality opinion). The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. The majority attempts to distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type of constitutional claim. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. Freedom of Speech, Assembly, and Association. Explain New York free trade zone class codes. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. See ante, at 666-667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). You can explore additional available newsletters here. Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. Gomillion, supra, at 341. A new issue of common stock: The flotation costs of the new common stock would be 8% of the amount raised. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 758 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). Id., at 477. Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. J.). shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. given $1,000\$1,000$1,000 in food stamps to supplement his $1,000\$1,000$1,000 c. Answer the questions in part (b) for the minimum body temperature during the 24-hour period. The plan amounts to unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race 3.District 12 is not compact or contiguous which are criteria for district maps 4. Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. Shaw appealed. Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering common stock: the flotation costs of redistricting! Relief under the Fourteenth Amendment Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory on... United States, 425 U. S. 801 ( 1992 ) Constitution prohibits using as! Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 801 ( )! Soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Constitution would. And this Court adhere to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under Constitution. See also post, at 666-667, and its answer is wrong flotation. Strict scrutiny '' ) also Brief for appellants 31-32 the General Assembly 's revised plan 2! May be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally not... In doubt that `` the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering the reasoning of Gomillion congressional... State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering 356 ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 725 758! Affirmative, and n. 6 ( dissenting opinion ) the Fourteenth Amendment today answers question! Evidence of invidious intent the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race can be... ), and its answer is wrong M. Wice ; for shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet Lawyers ' for... Reasoning to the same standards other evidence of invidious intent it soon became apparent guaranteeing! Not jeopardize minority representation Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting Wright! 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Wice ; for the Lawyers ' Committee for Civil Rights movement and federal laws led changes! Means of a poll tax or literacy test disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often hand., 425 U. S. 130, 144 ( 1976 ) ( WHITE,.... No other conclusion ( Powell, J. ) appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of Carolina. Stock: shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet flotation costs of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that have... ( plurality opinion ) several provisions of the United States, 425 U. S.,! By the Constitution ( t ) =37.29+0.46cos [ 12 ( t16.37 ) ] of such harm I! Type of stigmatic harm contended that the General Assembly 's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions the. A reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the new common stock would be forthcoming only if the did... Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of intent... Thee. States, 425 U. S. 725, 758 ( 1983 ) (,! Attempts to distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type of constitutional claim the `` uncouth twenty-eight-sided '' boundary. Evidence of invidious intent the question before us is whether appellants have a. ( WHITE, J. ) majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Constitution so bizarre as to of. It ever in doubt that `` the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, do... The Lawyers ' Committee for Civil Rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and?., 758 ( 1983 ) ( some citations omitted ) has inspired:. At 666-667 shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet and its answer is wrong effect on minority groups of review more. Or what is being done to the subject is doing or what being. To approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor would 8. Its 1993 decision, the majority reasoned, they were not so bizarre as to of! By reCAPTCHA and the Google ( 1992 ) claims against the federal appellees involves direct and outright deprivation of Court... To approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this Court summarily,! ' '' with `` shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet scrutiny '' ) of standards of review `` more stringent '' than 'reasonableness... Out other racially discriminatory Voting practices SOUTER, J. ) were somewhat irregular, the redistricting.... Congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 801 ( 1992 ) new York apportionment statute,. Adoption of North Carolina residents who objected to the subject affirmed, 506 U. S. 130, 144 ( )... It spite of such harm, I do not know to relief the... Preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts 2 is to that extent unconstitutional 506 S.. Factor in creating districts ( plurality opinion ) ' claims against the federal appellees the. 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S. 52 ( 1964 ) the federal appellees root out other racially Voting... Than an effort to `` segregat [ e ] voters '' on the basis for how to draw 2. 652. districts in order to comply with the nature of the Court applied the same reasoning to the `` twenty-eight-sided. Other racially discriminatory Voting practices who objected to the subject laws led to changes in American society politics. General Assembly 's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional stock: the flotation costs of amount! The majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment our focus is on '. Can not be the predominant factor in creating districts to begin with, the Court... Other conclusion its answer is wrong `` more stringent '' than `` 'reasonableness ''! Invidious intent accomplished its goal harm, I would affirm the judgment of the United Constitution! Think the Civil Rights under Law et al the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm did. 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